The demand for a national security strategy is again under public discussion as the neighbourhood gets into a flux, old enemies muscle up, and new friends are yet to commit themselves. India’s economic ambitions to be a $4 trillion economy, is also likely to also face strong headwinds as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza continue, dragging down global growth. The economy is really the key to everything else. After all, everyone wants a slice of the economic pie, from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Defence. That means prioritisation within rather scarce resources, and that is the key to national security strategy making.

Interpreting the term

For such an exercise, one has to first decide what comes under the umbrella term of ‘national security’. The problem is it means different things to different states, at different times.

For the United States, it once centred around a ‘union of our values and national interests’. That means you can stand up as the most powerful democracy, even while supporting a clutch of dictators for economic gain. After all, while Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy (NSS) mentions ‘values’ 29 times, it is centred around the need to maintain America’s leadership role. That means money. The U.S. NSS is the starting point for a host of other documents such as the Defence Department’s National Defense Strategy, and, thereafter, the ‘Posture’ document of each service. Then comes budgeting, where funds are sanctioned by Congress. Here is what else it is.

Across administrations, it is part of a power projection exercise, internally and externally. Externally, it is aimed to put the fear of god into such newly rising upstarts as China, and, internally, to project strength and determination to voters. Its public documents, therefore, showcase its capabilities, and sometimes exaggerate it. The United Kingdom which still sees itself as a global power, used an Integrated Review in 2021 that stressed working together with allies for a global role. It can hardly afford aircraft for its carriers, but it still helps to project oneself as a “European power with global interests”. For President Emmanuel Macron of France, the 2022 review arose from the break out of the Ukraine war, and a restatement of French nuclear deterrent. It was a political document in a bid for European leadership. It did not quite work, but the point was that it was issued for a specific purpose. There are no two opinions on the fact that India needs an NSS, that will bring together diverse aspects such as defence, finance, investments and climate change into one coherent whole, and then set a direction for the country. However this exercise needs to be done within the realm of top secrecy for some very good reasons. Consider that it will demand a clear statement of threat.

Now, multi-alignment

Budget speeches make no reference at all to the ‘enemy’ outside or within. Indeed, they hardly even mention defence. While it is accepted that the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity lies at the heart of national security, every Finance Minister is well aware that a strong economy is also aimed at an ability to retain sovereignty in international relations. Poor nations have to trail after the powerful ones, or form their own groupings. For India, that was once the Non-Aligned movement. That once ‘core value’ has been jettisoned given the need to defend itself against a belligerent eastern neighbour of highly unequal economic strength, even while not appearing to do so. Thus, it is “multialignment’, which means making friends with whoever is capable and willing to provide a possible back up in a crisis, and perhaps defence technology. Hence the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.), which discusses security bilaterally even while the grouping backs the freedom of the seas. On the other hand is BRICS, a China-led economic grouping together with Brazil and Russia, because you are not quite sure of putting all your eggs in one western basket. Besides, India’s $85 billion trade deficit with Beijing rather complicates things, given its frequent forays into and claims of Indian territory. Imagine how all of this would be described in a public national security document. No amount of good English can hide the fact that we cannot defend against China on our own, or that we have so little to do it with. Neither can we talk glibly about ‘allies’ like the U.K. does. We do not believe in alliances.

From threat prioritisation, the next level is the allocation of tasks to each service and the equipment that it needs to fulfil its mandate. True, defence budgeting is a relatively transparent exercise. However, a ‘strategy’ will need to decide which equipment or service one has to lean towards, and where it falls short. For instance, if the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is part of a strategy, then a hard exercise has to be on how to quickly upgrade your submarine- and ship-building capabilities. India’s submarine strength is about a fourth of China’s, while the picture is even worse in ship-building. Neither is the lag in the commissioning of warships something that you would want to advertise. A clever drafter could get round the details, but then without a clear identification of where our priorities and weaknesses lie, it is hardly a worthwhile exercise. Transparency is for the strong and not for those struggling to catch up. That is also why Pakistan’s defence budget is so opaque. A secret document on the other hand needs to highlight serious weaknesses, not just project ‘can do’ bravery. That is not strategy. That is hopeful optimism.

Now, consider what the central message needed for the voting public should be in an open document. The current trajectory of social media opinion demands a fair bit of chest thumping. Some of this is valid. After all, India is not prone to ‘adventuring’. But when it went to the defence of another country, it delivered results and withdrew speedily unlike global hegemons who got bogged down in places such as Afghanistan. These are values to be proud of. But neighbours would hardly appreciate one’s tom-tomming this as a virtue — at least not in the current dispensation. Besides, a rapacious public wants more. It wants a declaration of might and more. This kind of bravado would have the Opposition on your neck. So, internally, it has little value for political gain. Externally, a written National Security document would hardly allow the dexterous foreign policy flexibility apparent from our careful balancing on the Russia-Ukraine and Gaza wars, for instance. Backing democracy strongly in a written NS document would then be an exercise in hypocrisy. The U.S. can be as hypocritical as it pleases. It is a world power. India is not.

A full thread running through the economy

In sum, a national security document is an urgent need. It is not just about defence. Linked closely to it are priorities within the economy that will give a direction to industry, to financial institutions, and all the other tentacles that make up the lifeblood pulsing through the economy. That exercise is generally done piecemeal through various annual reports and surveys. The trick is to integrate it all together and set a direction for the country to reach where it wants to go, and fast. Therefore, the exercise is one best kept close to one’s chest, even as directives are issued separately to ministries and others. The National Security Council Secretariat is more than up to the task. Similar exercises have been done before, though in a voluminous style so beloved of bureaucracy. Here is some advice: keep it simple, keep it short, and keep it specific. And, above all, keep it well under wraps. Your enemies would be dying to know its contents.

Tara Kartha is Director, (Research and Analysis) Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

Published – September 23, 2024 12:16 am IST

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